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This paper investigates the impacts of cotton marketing reforms on farm productivity, a key
element for poverty alleviation, in rural Zambia. The reforms comprised the elimination of the
Zambian cotton marketing board that was in place since 1977. Following liberalization, the
sector adopted an outgrower scheme, whereby firms provided extension services to farmers and
sold inputs on loans that were repaid at the time of harvest. There are two distinctive phases of
the reforms: a failure of the outgrower scheme, and a subsequent period of success of the
scheme. Our findings indicate that the reforms led to interesting dynamics in cotton farming.
During the phase of failure, farmers were pushed back into subsistence and productivity in
cotton declined. With the improvement of the outgrower scheme of later years, farmers devoted
larger shares of land to cash crops, and farm productivity significantly increased.
Keywords: cotton marketing reforms, farm productivity
JEL codes: O12 O13 Q12 Q181 Introduction
In Africa, commodity markets were traditionally controlled by marketing boards, parastatal
organizations that connected domestic farmers with product and input markets. Typically,
these boards enjoyed monopsony power in purchases of agricultural products, and monopoly
power in sales of agricultural inputs to farmers. In many countries, particularly in
Sub-Saharan Africa, the public marketing boards were eliminated during the agricultural
liberalization of the 1990s.
The Zambian cotton sector is a good example of this type of reforms. Until 1994, Lintco
(Lint Company of Zambia) controlled the sector by selling inputs, buying cotton, giving
credit, and facilitating access to technology, equipment and know-how. In 1994, the sector
was liberalized, Lintco was privatized and entry into the market was encouraged. Sluggish
initial entry gave rise to a phase of regional private monopolies. During this phase, the ﬁrms
developed an outgrower scheme, vertical arrangements between ﬁr m sa n df a r m e r sw h e r e b y
cotton ginners (i.e., the ﬁrms) provided inputs on loans that were repaid at harvest time.
In 1998, as additional entry and competition ensued, the outgrower scheme began to fail.
Farmers would take loans from one ﬁrm (for instance, an incumbent ginner) while selling
to another (for instance, an entrant). As a result, credit prices increased, which, together
with declining international cotton prices, made cotton production less proﬁtable and led to
increasing farmer default. Around 2000, things started to get better: further entry led to
more competition and the outgrower scheme was highly perfected so that contracts between
farms and ﬁrms were mostly honored. At present, the market is relatively unregulated and
several ﬁrms seem to compete for locally produced cotton.
This paper investigates the dynamic impacts of cotton marketing reforms on farm
productivity and crop choices in Zambia. There are several channels through which the
reforms impacted on Zambian farmers. First, proﬁtability of cotton production was aﬀected,
mainly through changes in input and product prices. Second, the uncertainty associated
with cash cropping was aﬀected through changes in the transparency of cotton marketing
caused by the provision of extension services and technical assistance. Third, the transfer
of technology (new seeds) and cotton know-how may have driven farmers to more eﬃcient
1method of cultivation, increasing productivity and proﬁtability. Further, changes in credit
availability aﬀected the cost of ﬁnancing ﬁxed capital production costs. Overall, these
changes in prices, in access to inputs, and in eﬃciency of advice on crop husbandry, led
t oc h a n g e si nl a n da l l o c a t i o nt oc o t t o na n di nc otton yields. Our objective in this paper is
to quantify these impacts.
The empirical analysis exploits unusual farm surveys, the Post Harvest Surveys (PHS)
of the Zambian Central Statistical Oﬃce. These are repeated cross-sections of Zambian
farmers covering the 1997-2002 period. Information on land allocation, yields, input use,
and household characteristics across farmers in rural Zambia is collected. We use these data
to set up an empirical model of cotton crop choice and cotton productivity. Our identiﬁcation
strategy relies on a modiﬁed diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach. First, we take diﬀerences of
outcomes (i.e., cotton productivity) across the diﬀerent phases of the reforms. Second, we
use maize productivity to diﬀerence out unobserved household and aggregate agricultural
year eﬀects. Finally, since more productive cotton farmers are also more likely to allocate a
larger fraction of their land to cotton production, we use cotton shares, purged of observed
covariates, as a proxy for unobserved cotton-idiosyncratic productivity.
A simpler diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model, without the correction for selection and thus
without accounting for entry and exit into the agricultural cotton sector, would lead to biases
in the estimates of aggregate productivity. Exit of low productivity farmers in the failure
phase may bias productivity up, whereas entry of low productivity farmers in the success
phase may lead to downward biases in measured productivity. The importance of these
compositional eﬀects has been emphasized in the industrial productivity literature (Olley
and Pakes (1996), Pavcnik (2002)). We propose a diﬀerent dynamic approach to take care
of these eﬀects when measuring productivity in agriculture and which can be applied to
repeated cross-sections of farm-level data.
Our analysis provides valuable lessons on the interaction between export crops and
the adoption of domestic policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Further, by aﬀecting market
agricultural participation and cotton yields, our results have important implications for
household income and consumption. These are critical issues in rural Zambia, where poverty
2rates exceed 80 percent of the population.1 Since the success of the reforms and the outgrower
scheme varied from the initial phase to the ﬁnal phase, we ﬁnd rich dynamics in cotton
markets. During the initial phase, the failure of the outgrower scheme led to a decline in the
participation of households in cotton production and a decline in farm productivity of 45 to
53 percent. In contrast, the later phase of success induced farmers to increase the fraction of
land devoted to cotton, and caused yields per hectare to increase by 20 to 21 percent with
respect to the initial phase.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the main reforms in cotton
markets. In section 3, we discuss the theory behind crop choices and farm productivity in
Zambia. In section 4, we describe an empirical model of crop choices and farm productivity
using the Post Harvest Survey farm data; and derive guidelines for the estimation of the
impacts of the cotton marketing reforms. We discuss the results and assess the eﬀects of the
reforms in Section 5. In Section 6, we conclude.
2 T h eZ a m b i a nC o t t o nR e f o r m s
Z a m b i ai sal a n d l o c k e dc o u n t r yl o c a t e di nS o u t h e r nC e n t r a lA f r i c a . W i t hap o p u l a t i o no f
10.7 million and a per capita GDP of only 302 US dollars, Zambia is one of the poorest
countries in the world. In 1998, for instance, the national poverty rate was 69.6 percent,
with rural poverty at 82.1 percent and urban poverty at 53.4 percent. Nationwide, only
around 4 percent of the income of rural households comes from the sales of non-food crops.
Given the characteristics of the soil, cotton can only be grown in three Zambian provinces
(the Eastern, Central, and Southern provinces). Where it is grown, cotton is a major source
of income. In fact, using data from the Living Conditions Monitoring Survey of 1998, we
ﬁnd that the share of cotton in income was 8.4 percent in the Central province, 9.5 percent
in the Eastern province, and 2.8 percent in the Southern province. This makes cotton an
important sector in rural Zambia.
The process of reform began in 1991, when the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
1Poverty is widespread and deep in Zambia. For a comprehensive description of poverty trends, see Balat
and Porto (2005).
3(MMD) was elected. Faced with a profound recession, the new government implemented
economy-wide reforms such as macroeconomic stabilization, exchange rate liberalization,
trade and industrial reforms, and maize subsidies deregulation. More importantly for our
purposes, privatization of agricultural marketing in cotton was also pursued.2
Traditionally, the Zambian cotton sector was heavily regulated. From 1977 to 1994,
cotton marketing was controlled by the Lint Company of Zambia (Lintco), a parastatal
organization. Lintco set the sale prices of certiﬁed cotton seeds, pesticides, and sprayers, as
well as the purchase price of cotton lint. Lintco had monopsony power in cotton purchases
and monopoly power in inputs sales and credit loans to farmers.
In 1994, comprehensive cotton reforms began to take place. Most interventions were
eliminated when Lintco was sold to Lonrho Cotton. Initially, a domestic monopsony
developed early after liberalization. Soon, however, expanded market opportunities induced
entry of private ginners such as Swarp Textiles and Clark Cotton. Because these three major
ﬁrms segmented the market geographically, the initial phase of liberalization did not succeed
in introducing competition, giving rise, instead, to geographical monopsonies rather than
national oligopsonies.
At that moment, Lonrho and Clark Cotton developed an outgrower scheme with the
Zambian farmers. In these outgrower programs, ﬁrms provided seeds and inputs on loans,
together with extension services to improve productivity. The value of the loan was
deducted from the sales of cotton seeds to the ginners at picking time. Prices paid for
the harvest supposedly reﬂected international prices. Initially, repayment rates were high
(around roughly 86 percent) and cotton production signiﬁcantly increased. We called this
the outgrower introductory phase.
By 1998, the expansion of cotton farming attracted new entrants, such as Amaka Holdings
and Continental Textiles. Instead of the localized monopsonies, entrants and incumbents
started competing in many districts. As competition among ginners ensued, an excess
demand for cotton seeds developed. Several concurrent factors explain why, however, farmers
could not realize the full beneﬁts of the competition phase. First, some ﬁrms that were
2For more details on cotton reforms in Zambia, see Food Security Research Project (2000), and Cotton
News (2002).
4not using outgrower schemes started oﬀering higher prices for cotton to farmers who had
already signed contracts with other ﬁr m sa so u t g r o w e r .T h i sc a u s e dr e p a y m e n tp r o b l e m sa n d
increased the rate of loan defaults. The relationship between ginners and farmers started to
deteriorate. Second, world prices began to decline, and farm-gate prices declined as a result.
After many years of high farm-gate prices, and with limited information on world market
conditions, farmers started to mistrust the ginners. As the relationship between farmers and
ﬁrms deteriorated, default rates increased even further. In consequence, ﬁrms raised loan
prices and farmers end up receiving a lower net price for their cotton production. We called
this the outgrower scheme failure phase.
Partly as a result of this failure of the outgrower scheme, Lonrho exited the market
in 2000. A new major player, Dunavant Zambia Limited, entered instead. Dunavant
and competitors, Clark Cotton Limited, Amaka Holdings Limited, Continental Ginneries
Limited, Zambia-China Mulungushi Textiles, and Mukuba Textiles, worked to improve the
scheme. Farmers and ﬁrms understood the importance of honoring contracts and the beneﬁts
of maintaining a good reputation. The outgrower programs were perfected and there are
now two systems utilized by diﬀerent ﬁrms: the Farmer Group System and the Farmer
Distributor System. In the latter, ﬁrms designate one individual or farmer as the distributor
and provide inputs. The distributor prepares individual contracts with the farmers. He is
also in charge of assessing reasons for loan defaults, being able, in principle, of condoning
default in special cases. He is in charge of renegotiating contracts in incoming seasons. In
the Farmer Group System, small scale producers deal with the ginneries directly, purchasing
inputs on loan and repaying at the time of harvest. Both systems seem to work well. We
call this the outgrower scheme success phase.
3 Determinants of Cotton Productivity
In this section we review the literature on the determinants of agricultural productivity.
We deﬁne productivity as yields per hectare in physical units. Hence, our productivity
deﬁnition diﬀers from the standard deﬁnition used in industrial analysis (usually value added
5at constant prices). A physical deﬁnition of productivity is economically more meaningful
because it only reﬂects technology, while value added depends on market conditions via
prices.
In a model with decreasing returns to ﬁxed factors of production, a key determinant
of cotton yields per hectare is the size of the plot allocated to cotton. A family farm, for
instance, may obtain higher yields per unit of land if the scarce labor resources are utilized
in smaller plots. Major determinants of the size of land allocated to cotton can be found in
the literature on crop choice. There are diﬀerent factors determining this selection process,
and sometimes separate strands of literature explore the diﬀerent dimensions of the problem.
The theoretical problem is straightforward: endowed with a ﬁxed amount of land, the farmer
must choose the fraction of resources to be allocated to food crops (mainly maize) and cash
crop (mainly cotton).
A key factor is the trade-oﬀ between proﬁtability and risk, as in a standard portfolio
allocation choice (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993). Thus, relative product prices (cotton,
maize) and input prices (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides) aﬀe c tt h ec h o i c eo fc r o p s .I tm a yb e
argued that cash crops show higher returns but are riskier than food crops, so that diﬀerent
attitudes towards risks (degree of risk aversion) can help explain the selection (Binswanger
and Sillers, 1983; Dercon, 1996; Shahabuddin et al., 1982). Since direct measures of risk
aversion are not available, we need to proxy them with relevant household characteristics.
In particular, the attitude towards risk can be aﬀected by variables such as household wealth,
household size, and household composition.
Often times, growing cash crops requires a start-up lumpy investment that may constrain
the allocation of resources (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986; Dercon, 1996). Sometimes this takes
the form of capital investment in machines, tractors, animals. In addition, there might be
large initial costs of input purchases such as new seeds or expensive pesticides or sprayers.
In the presence of well-developed credit markets, these ﬁx e dc o s t sc o u l db ee a s i l yc o v e r e d .
When credit constraints are binding, however, the ability to borrow and the availability of
collateral can be determinants of the choice of crops.
An additional important argument claims that the allocation of resources is aﬀected by
6missing markets (de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet, 1991). In fact, whereas cash crops
must be sold at the market price, maize can be consumed in the family to provide food
security. In many less developed countries, concerns for food security are of the utmost
importance. Families will want to secure the food needs of the family ﬁrst, and then move
to cash cropping. If food markets were well-developed, then food risk would not be an issue
because households could grow cash crops, sell them at the market, and use the proceeds to
purchase food. If food markets are missing or are thin and isolated (so that ex-post food
prices are high and volatile), then a strategy of self-suﬃciency in food production may be
optimal (Fafchamps, 1992; Jayne, 1994). This suggests two sets of empirical determinants
of cotton choice. First, regional characteristics, such as the availability of food markets,
the number of food producers in the area, regional infrastructure, and other variables that
may aﬀect how thin local food markets are, may be relevant. Second, in the presence of
food security issues, the determinants of food needs may be important. Examples include
household size, household composition (so that, for instance, households with a larger fraction
of children would have larger food needs), land tenure, and non-farm income.
The switch from subsistence to cotton can be interpreted as technology adoption in
a g r i c u l t u r e . T h e r ei sal a r g el i t e r a t u r et h a te xplores the determinants of adoption (Besley
and Case, 1994; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Conley and Udry, 2004). This literature
identiﬁes human capital (measured by education, gender, and age) as a major determinant
of technology adoption. In addition, these authors argue that social capital, learning by
doing, and learning externalities are important determinants, too. In this setting, technology
adoption depends on the fraction of the neighbor farmers that have already adopted.
Many of these factors aﬀect productivity directly as well (and not only through the
cotton land allocation). For instance, the human capital of the farmer, as measured by his
age, gender, and education, surely aﬀects yields. Technology, in the form of crop know-how,
high yield seeds, and eﬃcient agricultural tools (like tractors or sprayers) may also lead
to a better use of resources and to higher productivity. Similarly, if the production of
the cash crops involves the initial purchase of inputs, capital goods, and machines, lack
of credit and collateral (determined by land size, assets, wealth, savings, oﬀ-farm income,
7and remittances) may hinder access to more eﬃcient resources like better seeds, sprayers
or animals (i.e., oxen). By the same token, access to local infrastructure and public goods
and capital can increase yields per hectare. Further, there is an important role played by
agricultural extension services and technical advice on crop husbandry, land use, and general
agricultural assistance that allow farmers to achieve higher productivity. A similar role can
be attached to social capital and learning externalities.
We are not only interested in the direct determinants of agricultural productivity, but also
in the impacts of the marketing reforms. There are several channels that can be advanced.
The provision of credit and of inputs on loan, which may allow farmers to better combine
factors of production, may depend on the phase so ft h er e f o r m .D u r i n gt h ec o l l a p s eo ft h e
outgrower scheme, credit became more expensive to farmers thus hindering productivity.
When the scheme improved, credit became cheaper, probably causing productivity to
increase. Similarly, the privatization of the ginning industry may cause ﬁrms to adopt better
cotton seeds (with higher yields) and more eﬃcient pesticides and fertilizers. This would
work as technological advances that ﬁrms pass-through to farmers, leading to increases in
farm productivity. Finally, the outgrower scheme involved an improvement in the provision
of extension services, particularly in terms of information about marketing. This could help
eliminate some uncertainty about the crop. In addition, more eﬃcient extension services,
providing advice on crop husbandry and know-how, can help farmers increase yields.
4 Data and Estimation Strategy
In this section, we describe the data and we develop the empirical model to estimate the
impacts of the cotton marketing reforms on farm productivity.
4.1 The Post Harvest Survey
We use farm surveys called the Post Harvest Survey (PHS). These data are collected by
the Zambian Central Statistical Oﬃce (CSO). The surveys are not panel data but rather a
set of repeated cross-sections. We have annual data available for the period 1997-2002.
8The survey is representative at the national level, but in this paper we only use the
data pertaining to cotton producing regions: the Central, Eastern, Southern and Lusaka
provinces. CSO gathers information on land tenure, land usage (allocation), output in
physical units, and household characteristics such as demographic composition, age of head,
and housing infrastructure. There are also limited data on farm assets and inputs.
Table 1 provides an overview of the relevant sample sizes, by year and by province.
Around 600-700 households are interviewed in the Central province, around 1,200, in the
Eastern province, around 800 in the Southern province, and around 200 in Lusaka. Table
2, which reports the fraction of farmers involved in cotton production, conﬁrms that these
are the major cotton producing areas. Signiﬁcant percentages of cotton farmers are only
observed in the Central, the Eastern, and the Southern provinces. Cotton participation
is largest in the Eastern province (39 percent in 2002, for instance), then in the Central
province (20 percent in 2002), and ﬁnally in the Southern province (12.6 percent). There are
some, but not many, cotton producers in the Lusaka region, too. In the remaining provinces,
the percentage of households involved in cotton is virtually zero.
Table 2 reveals interesting dynamic patterns that we explore below. During the
introduction phase, which spans the years 1997 and 1998, cotton participation is relatively
stable in all provinces (although a declining pattern may be discernible). The failure phase,
which spans the 1999-2000 period, shows lower participation rates. This is particularly
evident in 2000: in the Central province, for instance, cotton participation drops from 22.6
percent in 1998 to 10.3 percent. Similarly, participation declines from 32.7 to 20.4 percent in
the Eastern province, from 10.7 percent to 4.3 percent in the Southern provinces, and from
3.3 percent to 0.4 percent in Lusaka. The success phase correlated with entry into cotton:
the percentage of cotton growers increases signiﬁcantly in all provinces.
In Table 3, we report data on the fraction of land allocated to cotton. In 2002, for
instance, an average farmer in the Eastern province allocated around 17.2 percent of his land
to cotton; in the Central province, the fraction is 10.5 percent. Instead, cotton adoption is
less widespread in the Southern province, where only an average of 5.6 percent on land is
allocated to cotton. The dynamics of cotton adoption are also revealed in Table 3. The
9fraction of land allocated to cotton sharply declines in 1999 and 2000 and then increases in
2001 and 2002.
Finally, Table 4 describes the evolution of cotton yields per hectare. The ﬁgures are
in logarithms, so that changes from one year to the other can be interpreted as growth
rates. At the national level, cotton yields increased from 1997 to 1998, and then declined
during the failure phase. In fact, productivity dropped by 32 percent from 1998 to 2000.
However, productivity in 2000 is comparable to productivity in 1997. The success phase
brought productivity up in and 2001 and 2002. Notice that there were interesting diﬀerences
in regional dynamics. In the Eastern and Southern provinces, for instance, productivity
changes tracked those observed at the national level. However, in the Central province,
productivity increased steadily from 1997 to 2000 and then declined in the success phase of
2001 and 2002.
4.2 The Empirical Model
Productivity is deﬁned in physical units. Let yc
ht denote the volume of cotton production per














ht is a vector of household determinants of cotton yields including the age of the
household head, his education, the size of the household, household demographics, input
use, assets, the size of the land allocated to cotton, farm size, and district dummies.3




dummy variable that captures the second period of the reform, the outgrower scheme failure
phase of 1999-2000, and F2
t is another dummy that captures the third period of the reform,
the outgrower scheme success phase of 2001-2002. The impacts of these phases of the reform
are measured relatively to the excluded category, which is the outgrower scheme introductory
3Notice that (1) is a production function, not a supply function. Prices are not included in xc
ht.
10phase of 1997-1998.
The model includes a number of ﬁxed eﬀects, such as regional eﬀects (included in x),
year eﬀects, It, and idiosyncratic household level ﬁxed eﬀects ηht and φht.
The regional eﬀects include market access, local infrastructure, local knowledge and access
to credit; they are controlled for with district dummies. The year eﬀects It capture aggregate
agricultural eﬀects and other shocks that are common to all farmers in a given period t.I n
equation (1), these eﬀects cannot be separately identiﬁed from the reform dummies F 1 and
F2. To deal with this, we propose below to model productivity in other crops (mainly maize)
to diﬀerence out time varying factors that aﬀect productivity in agriculture.
The household level ﬁxed eﬀect has two components: a farm eﬀect, η, and a cotton-speciﬁc
eﬀect, φ.T h e f a r m e ﬀect η captures all idiosyncratic factors aﬀecting general agricultural
productivity in farm h that are not observed by the econometrician and are thus not included
in x. It includes land quality, know-how, and other factors that aﬀect productivity in
all crops. The cotton-speciﬁce ﬀect is a combination of unobserved factors that aﬀect
productivity in cotton, including ability and expertise in cotton husbandry and suitability
of the land for cotton.
There are two problems with the household ﬁxed eﬀects. First, both η and φ are
unobserved by the econometrician but observed by the farmer when making input decisions.
Hence, some of the variables included in x may be correlated with these unobservables. In
addition, entry and exit into cotton farming depend on these unobservables as well since
f a r m e r s ’d e c i s i o n so nl a n da l l o c a t i o nt od i ﬀerent crops may be based on η and φ.M o r e
importantly for our purposes, this entry/exit component aﬀects the estimates of the reform
dummies by altering the composition of farmers that produce cotton in each time period.
A panel data set would allow us to account for both idiosyncratic eﬀects.4 The Post
Harvest Survey, however, is a repeated cross section of farmers. We thus need additional
modeling to deal with the ﬁxed eﬀects. We propose to model agricultural productivity in
maize to control for η (and the year eﬀects It, as discussed above) and to model the share of
4The unobservables η and φ are indexed by ht because, given the cross-sectional nature of the data, the
unit of observation is a household-time period combination. However, if the data were a panel, η and φ
would be indexed by h only.
11land devoted to cotton to control for φ. In what follows, we discuss these two methodological
features of our empirical model.
Productivity in Maize Farming
Our empirical analysis relies on a modiﬁed diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach. The simple
diﬀerence in average cotton productivity after controlling for farm level variables in any
two of the reform phases (i.e., the introductory, the failure, and the success phases) is
not a consistent estimate of the impacts. It does not take into account the general trend
or time-varying aggregate eﬀects in agriculture, It. In addition, there are unobserved
idiosyncratic farm eﬀects that can aﬀect inputs choices, ηt. To account for these household
and agricultural eﬀects, we perform a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis using a model of maize
productivity.
In principle, the second diﬀerencing works because maize is a major food crop that
is produced by virtually all cotton farmers.5 Table 5, which reports the percentage of
households that grow maize, provides evidence supporting this. We ﬁnd that in the cotton
provinces, maize is grown by virtually all households. Participation in maize production is
always above 90 percent in the relevant regions. In the Eastern and Lusaka provinces, the
percentage of maize producers is nearly 100 percent. Table 6 reports additional evidence
that further supports our diﬀerencing strategy. We report the percentage of farmers that
grow maize, conditional on being cotton growers. These shares are nearly 100 percent in the
three main cotton-growing provinces.
Yields per hectare in maize, ym





htβm + It + ηht +  
m
ht,
Maize productivity depends on covariates xm
ht, including regional eﬀects, the agricultural year
eﬀects, It,a n dt h ef a r me ﬀects ηht.6
5A key characteristic of cotton farming in Zambia is its scale: cotton is grown by smallholders, family
farms endowed with small farms, usually smaller than four hectares and with an average size of around 2
hectares.
6In an alternative interpretation of this model, there are unobserved cotton and maize eﬀects, and φht
captures their relative importance.
12By taking diﬀerences, we get










t + b0φht +  ht.
Here, the observed household covariates xht included in the estimation are based on
the determinants of productivity discussed in the previous section, such as household
demographics, human capital, determinants of household collateral, determinants of food
needs, etc. Equation (3) includes regional dummies, which are not cancelled out in the
diﬀerencing because we allow the regional eﬀects to aﬀect productivity in cotton and maize
diﬀerently. For example, to the extent that the district dummies capture local market access
eﬀects, we allow marketing conditions to aﬀe c tc o t t o n( ac a s hc r o pa c t i v i t y )a n dm a i z e( a
mostly subsistence crop) diﬀerently.
The coeﬃcients α1 and α2 measure the impacts of the diﬀerent phases of the reforms
on cotton productivity. There are two important identiﬁcation assumptions. First, we
assume that the agricultural eﬀects, It aﬀect cotton and maize productivity proportionately.
This is a consequence of the logarithmic speciﬁcation that we adopt. In other words,
the agricultural eﬀects are assumed to have the same eﬀe c to ng r o w t ho fc o t t o na n d
maize output per hectare.7 This is an instance of the parallel trend assumption of
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences models. It means that we can use the trend in maize productivity
to predict the counterfactual productivity in cotton in the absence of the reforms. Although
this assumption cannot be tested directly, we can provide indirect evidence supporting
it. In particular, the assumption implies that we could use productivity in other crops
to diﬀerence out the agricultural eﬀects. Under the maintained hypothesis, the trend in
maize productivity and the trend in the productivity of other crops should be similar.
Figure 1 provides evidence that supports this. Each panel compares the trend in maize
productivity (solid line) with the trend in alternative crops (broken line). These are sorghum,
millet, sunﬂower, groundnuts, and mixed beans. We observe that, perhaps with the sole
exception of groundnuts in 2001, the trends in all these crops are very similar. In the
7O fc o u r s e ,t h el e v e le ﬀect is going to be diﬀerent. This is reasonable, since physical units of cotton and
maize are not comparable.
13regression analysis, we use maize as control because, as opposed to the other crops, virtually
all household produce it.
The second critical assumption of our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model is that the cotton
reforms did not aﬀect maize productivity. Theoretically, agricultural reforms of the type
studied here are likely to aﬀect productivity in all crops through resource allocation (i.e.,
labor, eﬀort, fertilizers, pesticides), relative prices, and capital accumulation. In addition,
there may be indirect channels, through, for example, access to credit. If the reforms aﬀect
farms by providing cotton inputs on loan, household resources to purchase seeds or fertilizers
in maize may be released. To the extent that the regression includes these variables in the
observed covariates x,t h e s ee ﬀects will be accounted for. In the regressions, we include
measures of labor, agricultural tools, and fertilizers, land allocation.
Notice, however, that for some determinants, such as labor allocation, we only have
household level data (as opposed to crop level data). This raises the possibility that the
reforms aﬀected maize productivity and that α1 and α2 are measures of the impacts of
the reforms on cotton productivity relative to maize productivity. We could rule out this
possibility by providing additional evidence of the trends in maize productivity in those
provinces that were not aﬀected by the cotton reforms. These trends are plotted in Figure 2.
The solid line corresponds to the trend in maize productivity in reform provinces. Instead,
the broken line displays the trend in non-reform provinces. It can be seen that the parallel
trend holds in this case, except in 2002. Overall, this indicates that the diﬀerencing will
identify the impact of the reform on cotton productivity only.
Entry and Exit in Cotton Farming
In most applications, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach described above would be enough.
In the present case, there may be additional cotton-speciﬁc unobserved factors at the farm
level, such as suitability of the land for cotton production and know-how of cotton husbandry,
that aﬀect productivity in cotton. This heterogeneity leads to diﬀerent entry-exit decisions
regarding cotton production, which alters the composition of the group of farmers that
produce cotton in each of the reform phases. The estimates of the changes in productivity
14at the aggregate level comprise both the changes in productivity at the farm level and
the changes in the composition of the farmers that produce cotton in each time period. The
consistent estimation of the changes in productivity at the farm level requires that we control
for entry and exit.
More precisely, if there are ﬁx e dc o s t si nc o t t o np r o d u c t i o n ,t h e nc o t t o nw i l lo n l yb e
proﬁtable if productivity is high enough. This means that there is a cut-oﬀ (which depends
on prices, market conditions, infrastructure) such that farmers with productivity above this
cut-oﬀ will enter the market and farmers below the cut-oﬀ will not enter (or exit, if they
were in the market already). When the reforms increase the proﬁtability of cotton, for
instance, lower productivity farmers may enter the market. Failure to control for this may
lead to inconsistently lower estimates of productivity at the farm level (thus leading to a
downward bias in the estimates of any productivity increases). In contrast, in periods of
induced exit, farmers with lower unobserved productivity will be more likely to abandon
cotton production. In consequence, measures of productivity that do not control for these
dynamic eﬀects may be artiﬁcially high (thus leading to downward biases in the estimates
of productivity declines).
Figure 3 clariﬁes these dynamics. The graph shows relative cotton productivity y as a
function of unobserved cotton-speciﬁce ﬀects φ — for simplicity of exposition we assume that
the exogenous part of x is the same for all farmers and that the only diﬀerence across farmers
is given by φ. Productivity is increasing in φ since better land quality or higher cotton skills
will lead to higher output (for a given usage of other inputs). The horizontal line at y
denotes the cut-oﬀ; for simplicity, we assume here that it does not vary with the reforms. It
follows that we can determine a cut-oﬀ for the unobservables, denoted φ. The line denoted
y0 represents the cotton productivity function before the reform. Average productivity is,
say, E(y0), the average of y for levels of φ>φ.
Consider the eﬀects of the failure of the outgrower scheme. If cotton productivity is
negatively aﬀected, the productivity curve shifts down to y1. Assuming a ﬁxed cut-oﬀ y,t h e
cut-oﬀ for the unobservables increases to φ
0
.8 This induces the “exit” of those farmers with
8It is not necessary to assume that y remains ﬁxed after the reform. Our intuition remains unchanged.
15relatively low levels of φ,b e t w e e nφ
0
and φ. Average productivity drops to E(y1). But the
decline in individual productivity is larger. The right quantity is the average productivity,
computed along the curve y1, and integrating over values of φ above the cutoﬀ before the
reform φ.T h i si sg i v e nb yE(yr).
The diﬀerence in diﬀerences model described so far estimates changes in average
productivity given by E(y0) − E(y1). To estimate the true eﬀect at the farm level,
E(y0) − E(yr), we need to account for the role of unobserved cotton eﬀects.9
Entry-exit eﬀects have been extensively considered in industrial productivity analysis. 10
In this paper we extend this literature by developing a method to deal with entry and exit in
the estimation of agricultural production functions and crop choices. Furthermore, whereas
the industrial organization literature relies on longitudinal surveys, our method can be used
in repeated cross-sections.
Our solution to this problem is to construct proxies for the unobserved productivity
parameter. Our method exploits the idea that since households with high φ are more
productive in cotton, they are also more likely to devote a larger share of their land to
cotton production. This means that we could use land cotton shares as a proxy for the
unobservable φht in (3). In practice, consistent estimation requires that we purge these
shares of the part explained by observed determinants of cotton choice.
Let ac
ht be the fraction of land allocated to cotton. A general model of these shares is
(4) a
c
ht = m(zht,φ ht),
where z is a vector of regressors which includes district eﬀects that aﬀect selection into cotton
production. For instance, we use the district dummies to capture access to market and local
infrastructure that facilitates farmer participation in market cash agriculture. The function
9Notice that omitting φ not only leads to inconsistencies because of the entry-exit eﬀects, but also may
induce correlation between some variables in the vector x and the error term in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
model. For example, the choice of inputs, such as labor or pesticide use, will depend on φ (so that higher
levels of unobserved productivity may be positively correlated with input use) The model in (3) takes care
of these biases.
10See Olley and Pakes (1996) and Pavcnik (2002) for models of industrial productivity with entry and exit
with panels of ﬁrms.
16m allows regressors z and unobservables φ to aﬀect the shares a non-linearly.






Estimation of (5) is straightforward, except for the fact that the share of land devoted to
cotton is censored at zero. This means that OLS may be inconsistent. A simple solution is to
implement a Tobit procedure. More generally, we explore a more semi-parametric estimation
of (5) by using a CLAD (censored least absolute deviation) model. Notice that, provided
the right speciﬁcation for the model is used, consistency follows because the regressors z are
exogenous to φ. This requires that fertility, family composition, or farm size do not depend
on unobservables such as cotton-speciﬁca b i l i t yo rl a n dq u a l i t y . I m p o r t a n t l y ,s i n c ew eu s e
data on all households to estimate (5), this equation does not suﬀer from a selection problem
like the one we are attempting to control for in the productivity model.
The allocation of land to cotton depends on several key factors that we need to account
for. In particular, the selecti o ni n t oc o t t o nd e p e n d so nt h er e f o r m . T h i sm e a n st h a tw e
should include F1 and F2 in (5). Cotton choices depend on output and input prices, too.
Unfortunately, we do not have information on prices at the farm level. To the extent that
prices vary by time, or by region, however, we can account for them with year or regional
dummies. In practice, we estimate a diﬀerent model like (5) in each of the six years from
1997 to 2002 (notice that γt is indexed by t in (5)). This means that we will not be able to
separate the eﬀects of the reforms from the eﬀects of changes in international prices on land
allocation, but we will be able to control eﬀectively for φ in the productivity model.11
Finally, note that identiﬁcation of φ requires that the selection into cotton is aﬀected by
t h es a m eu n o b s e r v a b l e st h a ta ﬀect cotton productivity. In principle, it would be possible
to argue that there are additional unobservable factors that aﬀect the selection into cotton.
We extend our results to the case where these unobservables diﬀer in section 5.1.
11We also consider the possibility of estimating diﬀerent selection models in diﬀerent years and in diﬀerent
provinces. This would control for idiosyncratic provincial eﬀects in cotton adoption. We report results in
the next section.
17Plugging in the estimates of φ in (3), the productivity model is






ht + b0b φht +e  ht.
This modiﬁed diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach is consistent with entry and exit into cotton
farming.
5R e s u l t s
Our benchmark productivity results are reported in Table 7. Columns (1) and (2)
report estimates of equation (1), that is, a productivity model that does not control for
unobservables such as It, ηht and φht. In these regressions, we use data from the three
main cotton provinces, the Central, the Eastern, and the Southern provinces. The main
ﬁndings indicate that small farms are more productive; there is also evidence in favor or
decreasing returns to scale in cotton since there is a negative association between the size
of land allocated to cotton and cotton yields per hectare. The negative association between
farm size and household agricultural productivity has long been established in the literature
(Feder, 1985; Benjamin, 1994). In addition, households with male heads are more productive
in cotton, as are larger households. Assets (such as ploughs or livestock) are positively
associated with yields. The eﬀects of inputs such as basal and top-dressing fertilizers are not
as strong as expected.12
The dynamics of cotton productivity are closely linked to the dynamics in market
structure: compared to the introductory phase, productivity is lower in the failure phase
a n dh i g h e ri nt h esuccess phase. The estimated magnitudes are important: in the failure
phase, productivity declines by around 15.1 percent (column 2) and increases by 11.9 percent
in the success phase.
Columns (3) and (4) report results of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model (equation (3)).
The estimated impacts of the marketing reforms are signiﬁcantly higher. On the one hand,
12One reason for these result is that both basal and top-dressing fertilizers are actually used in maize more
than in cotton. See the discussion below for more details.
18productivity during the failure phase declines by 45.1 percent (column 4) instead of by 15.1
percent (column 2). This is because there is a positive trend in yields (net of the eﬀects of
covariates) from the introductory to the failure phase. On the other hand, the increase in
productivity during the success phase is of around 20.8 percent (column 4) as opposed to
11.9 percent (column 2). This suggests a declining trend in yields from the introductory to
the success phase. Interestingly, this means that, when comparing the failure and success
phases, productivity in fact increases by a whopping 65.9 percent.
Table 8 reports the productivity results corrected for entry and exit.13 Column (1)
reproduces the estimates from column (4) of Table 7, which does not include controls for φ.
Columns (2) and (5) use a Tobit model to estimate the selection equation, columns (3) and
(6) use a linear model, and columns (4) and (7) use a CLAD model. Model 1 and Model 2
in Table 8 diﬀer in the list of covariates: both models share the same regressors, but Model
1 measures assets (harrows and ploughs) in monetary units and Model 2 measures them
in physical units. Notice that since the regression includes an estimated regressor, b φ,t h e
standard errors should be corrected. We estimate them with a bootstrap model with 100
repetitions.
We conﬁrm that productivity declines during the failure phase (i.e., α1 is negative and
signiﬁcant), and increases during the success phase (i.e., α2 is positive and signiﬁcant). The
results are robust to the selection model used to build the proxy for φ, i.e., the linear model,
the Tobit model or the CLAD model. The decline of cotton yields per hectare during the
failure phase ranges from 49.6 to 53.6 percent. The coeﬃcients of F2 range from 0.202 to
0.209.
Failure to control for φ can damage the estimated impacts of the reforms on productivity
at the farm level, particularly during the failure phase. In column (1), we report a decline
in average productivity of 45.1 percent from the introductory phase to the failure phase.
When exit is accounted for, the decline in productivity is, instead, of around 51.9 percent.
This means that although the average aggregate productivity in the economy declined by
45.1 percent, the average productivity of a typical cotton farm declined by 51.9 percent. In
13The ﬁrst-stage results of diﬀerent selection models are discussed in Appendix 1.
19other words, average productivity is 6.8 percent higher than what it would be hadn’t the
most unproductive farmers (in terms of φ) exited the market.
It is interesting to notice that, during the success phase, the reforms increase yields by
around 20.2 percent, comparable to the ﬁndings in column (1). That is, the estimated α2
do not depend on whether the regression controls for φ or not. This means that entry is not
aﬀecting the estimated changes in average productivity by much. One explanation of this
ﬁnding is that entry is much more costly than exit. When unobservables φ are such that
cotton becomes unproﬁtable, farmers may exit at no signiﬁcant cost. Instead, when cotton
becomes proﬁtable, there might still be impediments to entry.
5.1 Further Speciﬁcation Issues in Selection
So far, we have assumed that φ enters additively in the landc o t t o ns h a r e se q u a t i o n( 5 )
and that the same combination of unobservable factors aﬀects cotton productivity —equation
(3)— and the cotton share decision — equation (5). However, there are reasons to believe that
the residuals from (5) are a non-linear function of the unobservables φ,o rt h a tt h e r ea r e
unobserved factors in addition to φ that aﬀect the cotton share decision.






where ρht = ft(φht). The productivity model is






ht + gt(ρht)+e  ht,
where gt(ρht)=f
−1
t (ρht). This model can be estimated using a partially linear model
(Robinson, 1988). In the ﬁrst stage, both lny and all of the covariates x are regressed
on ρ non-parametrically. This is done using a locally weighted linear regression (Pagan and
Ullah, 1999). In the second stage, we estimate residuals for all these variables using the
non-parametric estimates. Finally, a linear OLS regression between residuals is run. This
20procedure recovers the linear part of the model, β, α1,a n dα2.14
The results of the partially linear model are reported in Table 9. In all our speciﬁcation,
we ﬁnd that the non-parametric correction does not aﬀect the estimates of the impacts of
the reforms. Concretely, the failure phase leads to a decline in productivity of 52-53 percent,
whereas the success phase leads to increases of productivity of around 20 percent.
Regarding the additional unobservables in the choice of cotton share, let us assume that





htγt + φht + uht.
This equation includes uht,t o g e t h e rw i t hφht, in the error term to capture potential additional
unobservables that aﬀect the selection into cotton but not the productivity equation. The
implication of this model for our purposes is that our proxy of unobserved productivity is
now estimated with error (see Altonji, 1986).
The problem resembles estimation under measurement error. In principle, these problems
are corrected with instrumental variables. Notice that, in our case, we need to instrument
b φht + b uht. Since we do not have instruments for this variable, we follow the procedures used
in Monte Carlo analysis of measurement error. If we knew the variance of the measurement
error —that is, the variance of u—, then it would be in principle possible to correct the OLS
estimates to get consistent estimates. The problem is precisely that the variance of u is not
known. In Monte Carlo studies, the model is estimated under diﬀerent assumptions about
the variance. If the estimated coeﬃcients do not change much with σ2
u, then there is evidence
that the measurement error is not generating signiﬁcant inconsistencies.
Our results are reported in Table 10. We report the estimates of α1, α2 and a0 under
eleven diﬀerent assumptions about σ2
u.W e c o n ﬁrm that the coeﬃcients of the phases of
the reform, and the unobserved productivity remain relatively unaﬀected by the potential
measurement error. We believe that this is evidence that the problem can be safely discarded
and that our results are not sensitive to it.
14The non-linear function gt(·) can be estimated with a non-parametric regression of lny, purged of the
observed covariates x, F1,a n dF2,o nρ.
215.2 Robustness
Our robustness analysis follows along three lines: sensitivity to the deﬁnition of the reforms,
sensitivity to the inclusion of Lusaka growers in the sample, and diﬀerences in regional
analysis.
Table 11 reports estimates for diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the reforms. The dynamics
generated by the elimination of the marketing board are generally complex, and it may
be diﬃcult to assign diﬀerent years to the diﬀerent phases of the reforms. Our estimates
can thus be sensitive to the deﬁnition that is being used. To examine the robustness of our
results, we re-estimate the model using two additional deﬁnitions of the reforms. First, we
redeﬁne the failure phase as including only the year 2000 (dummy denoted R1) and including
1999 in the introductory phase. As shown in section 4.1 (Tables 2, 5 and 6), the drop in the
share of land allocated to cotton declines much more markedly in 2000 than in 1999. Similar
observations characterize the trends in cotton yields. The success phase still includes 2001
and 2002 (with dummy deﬁned by R2). In our second redeﬁn i t i o n ,w em e a s u r et h ei m p a c t s
of the reforms by including year dummies, thus allowing the eﬀe c t so ft h er e f o r m st ov a r y
year by year. In this model, there are six phases in the dynamics that we estimate.
We estimate two diﬀerent models in Table 11. Columns (1) to (3) use a Tobit procedure
and Model 1 of Table 8 (measuring assets in monetary units) for the estimation of ac
ht;
columns (4) to (6) also use a Tobit model, but adopt Model 2 (assets in physical units) of
Table 8. Our qualitative conclusions remain unaﬀected. There is a decline in productivity in
2000 of around 30 percent in both speciﬁcations. Also, there is an increase in productivity in
the success phase of 16.2 percent. More detailed patterns can be discerned when we use year
dummies to measure the diﬀerent phases of the reforms. Compared to 1997, we ﬁnd that
productivity ﬁrst increases in 1998 and declines in 1999 to 1997 levels. We still ﬁnd a large
decline in productivity in 2000, of around 41 percent. During the success phase, productivity
follows an increasing trend: output per hectare is 20 percent higher in 2001 than in 1997,
and 40 percent higher in 2002.
In Table 12, we reproduce Table 11 but we include Lusaka in the estimation. There are
fewer cotton growers in Lusaka, but enough to allow us to check if results are sensitive to the
22inclusion of those farmers in our model. Table 12 conﬁrms that the estimated impacts are
essentially unchanged. For Model 1, for example, the coeﬃcients of F1 and F2 in column
(1) are −0.522 and 0.202, respectively, close to what we found before (−0.519 and 0.202).
Similarly, the coeﬃcients of R1 and R2 (column 2) are −0.287 and 0.167 (similar to −0.298
and 0.162 in Table 8). Finally, the pattern of year phases are also similar to those estimated
before (column 3): there is an increase in productivity in 1998, a decline in 1999 and a
sharper decline in 2000, and ﬁnally signiﬁcant increases in 2001 and 2002.15
We have shown evidence indicating that cotton productivity followed diﬀerent patterns in
diﬀerent regions of the country. In Table 13, we report estimates of the model that account
for these diﬀerences. Concretely, we estimate a separate model for each of the three main
cotton producing provinces. The ﬁrst three columns of the table reproduce the benchmark
results at the national level. When the original deﬁnition of the phases of the reforms is
used, F1 and F 2, the estimated regional coeﬃcients track the national coeﬃcients: they
are negative and signiﬁcant during the failure phase and positive and signiﬁcant during the
success phase. Notice, however, that the magnitudes are very diﬀerent. In particular, much
more pronounced changes are observed in the Southern province. For example, whereas
the decline in productivity during the failure phase is of around 42 and 44.5 percent in the
Central and Eastern provinces, respectively, it is of 96.5 percent in the Southern province.
This means that the coeﬃcient of F1 almost double (in absolute value) in the Southern
province. The coeﬃcient of F 2 varies from region to region as well, from 0.303 and 0.106 in
the Central and Eastern provinces, to 0.554 percent in the Southern provinces.
Some interesting diﬀerences are also observed when we use alternative deﬁnitions of the
phases of the reforms. This is specially so under R1 and R2.16 In the Central province, for
example, there is a large increase in productivity during the success phase, but no statistically
signiﬁcant changes during the failure phase of 2000. In contrast, in the Eastern province
there is a signiﬁcant decline in the failure phase of 2000 (R1), but there is not any signiﬁcant
change during the success phase. Finally, the Southern province shows a sharp decline (of
15These results are robust to the speciﬁcation and model used in the cotton land share (ac
ht) equation
(Model 1 or Model 2, for instance).
16R1 includes only 2000, and R2 includes 2001 and 2002 (as does F2). The diﬀerence is that the
introductory phase now includes 1999.
2334.8 percent) in failure phase, and a sharp increase (of 55.7 percent) in the success phase.
6 Conclusions
This has paper has investigated the relationship between market structure in cotton and
farm productivity. We have used unique farm surveys for rural Zambia, the Post Harvest
Survey, spanning the 1997-2002 period. We have exploited a marketing reform whereby the
Zambian government eliminated the cotton marketing board in 1994. Entry and exit into
the market and the development of the outgrower scheme gave rise to interesting dynamics
in market organization. Starting with a baseline period in 1997-1998, there was a subsequent
failure of the outgrower scheme in 1999 and 2000. Further entry and competition into the
sector led to an improvement in the outgrower scheme in 2001-2002.
We have estimated the impacts of the diﬀerent phases of the reforms by building
am o d i ﬁed diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator. The ﬁrst diﬀerences are taken across the
diﬀerent phases of the reforms. An equation of maize productivity, a major staple produced
by virtually all households, provides the second diﬀerence. In the presence of entry and exit
into cotton farming, and in the presence of cotton-speciﬁc farm unobservables, the estimated
average productivity can be biased. To correct for these dynamics eﬀects, we introduce a
model of selection into cotton that provides proxies for unobserved productivity. These
proxies are given by land cotton shares (i.e., the shares of total land allocated to cotton)
“purged” of the eﬀects of observed covariates. This modiﬁed diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model
delivers consistent estimate of the impacts of the reforms on farm productivity.
We ﬁnd interesting dynamic eﬀects of the marketing reforms. Compared to the
introductory phase of 1997-1998, the failure of the outgrower scheme caused farmers to move
back to subsistence and led to signiﬁcant reductions in farm productivity. The improvement
of the outgrower scheme in 2001-2002, reverted these trends: farmers allocated more land to
cotton, and productivity (i.e., yields per hectare) signiﬁcantly increased.
24A p p e n d i x1 :C o t t o nS e l e c t i o nM o d e l s
Table A.1 reports a set of results of the selection equation. These estimates are obtained
from a Tobit model. Qualitatively similar results are estimated with OLS or the CLAD
models. We ﬁnd that household assets are positivelyl i n k e dt ol a n dc o t t o ns h a r e s . T o t a l
land and whether the household raise livestock can work as collateral perhaps allowing the
household to obtain cheaper credit and to purchase inputs or to aﬀord any initial investment.
In addition, household assets may allow farms to adopt riskier (but also more proﬁtable)
agricultural activities.
The size of the family also aﬀects cotton allocation positively. One explanation is
that bigger households can take care of own-consumption needs (food security) and have
additional resources needed to embark in cash agriculture. A related ﬁnding in Table A.1
is that household with higher proportion of males tend to allocated higher shares of land to
cotton. This is consistent with the notion that the availability of labor supply matters in
t h ec h o i c eo fc r o p s .
Finally, there is some evidence that male-headed households tend to grown more cotton
than female-headed families.
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Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Central 654 674 648 795 663 701
Eastern 1,225 1,197 1,255 1,437 1,248 1,292
Southern 895 828 835 961 835 850
Lusaka 246 252 243 244 185 182
Copperbelt 370 349 379 464 367 372
Luapula 803 775 799 869 760 761
Northern 1,211 1,190 1,348 1,551 1,293 1,376
Nwestern 409 423 429 543 435 431
Western 706 648 725 835 699 733
Total 6,519 6,336 6,661 7,699 6,485 6,698
Note: Own calculations based on the Post Harvest Surveys 1997-2002.
Table 2
Percentage of Farmers Growing Cotton
1997 - 2002
Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Central 24.6 22.6 16.6 10.3 14.7 20.2
Eastern 35.2 32.7 31.7 20.4 32.1 39.0
Southern 9.9 10.7 11.7 4.3 8.8 12.8
Lusaka 5.4 3.3 4.7 0.4 5.1 8.2
Copperbelt 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Luapula 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Northern 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NWwestern 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Western 1.3 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0
Total 11.0 10.4 9.4 5.4 9.0 11.6
Note: Own calculations based on the Post Harvest Surveys 1997-2002.
28Table 3
Fraction of Land Allocated to Cotton
1997 - 2002
Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total 9.2 9.3 8.1 4.3 7.6 9.9
Central 12.1 10.7 6.7 3.5 6.3 8.5
Eastern 12.4 13.0 12.3 7.2 11.9 14.6
Southern 4.1 4.2 3.7 1.3 3.2 5.1
Lusaka 2.4 1.4 1.7 0.1 1.9 3.3
Note: Own calculations based on the Post Harvest Surveys 1997-2002.
Table 4
Yields per Hectare in Cotton
1997 - 2002
Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total 6.18 6.53 6.38 6.21 6.44 6.39
Central 6.33 6.67 6.72 7.04 6.98 6.73
Eastern 6.14 6.45 6.28 6.07 6.32 6.32
Southern 6.09 6.65 6.40 5.56 6.57 6.23
Lusaka 6.00 6.40 6.43 6.40 5.51 6.57
Note: Own calculations based on the Post Harvest Surveys 1997-2002.
Table 5
Percentage of Households that Grow Maize
1997 - 2002
Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Central 90.2 92.2 93.5 94.3 94.0 93.2
Eastern 99.9 99.5 99.2 99.5 99.7 99.6
Southern 93.5 92.0 94.4 96.3 97.3 97.6
Lusaka 100.0 99.5 98.9 100.0 98.9 99.4
Copperbelt 96.7 94.3 90.9 93.5 93.5 93.6
Luapula 28.5 24.3 31.6 35.1 31.8 41.1
Northern 45.1 35.9 48.8 46.9 46.9 59.3
NWestern 75.7 65.9 71.9 66.7 80.7 77.7
Western 89.9 82.2 88.5 82.6 90.1 87.2
Total 76.2 72.1 76.1 76.2 77.7 80.7
Note: Own calculations based on the Post Harvest Surveys 1997-2002.
29Table 6
Percentage of Households that Grow Maize
Conditional on Growing Cotton
1997 - 2002
Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Central 96.7 95.7 95.1 100.0 97.9 99.3
Eastern 100.0 98.4 98.7 99.7 99.5 100.0
Southern 97.6 90.5 96.8 97.4 93.1 92.4
Lusaka 100.0 100.0 88.9 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total 98.8 96.6 97.7 99.5 98.4 98.8




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age of household head 0.005 0.005 0.014 0.01
0.006 0.006 0.008* 0.007
Age squared −6.93E-05 −7.83E-05 −1.62E-04 −1.26E-04
6.15E-05 6.09E-05 0.78E-04** 0.76E-0.4*
Male household head 0.121 0.124 0.093 0.088
0.040*** 0.040*** 0.047** 0.047*
Family size 0.103 0.079 −0.037 0.007
0.031*** 0.031** 0.036 0.036
Share of males −0.014 −0.033 −0.035 −0.038
0.087 0.087 0.106 0.105
Farm type −0.109 −0.061 0.12 0.057
0.038*** 0.039 0.043*** 0.044
Size cotton plot −0.292 −0.307
0.023*** 0.023***
Relative plot size −0.343 −0.376
0.024*** 0.024***
Livestock 0.132 0.091 −0.063 −0.06





Basal fertilizer 0.088 −0.713
0.109 0.257***
Top-dressing fertilizer 0.09 −0.621
0.107 0.283**
F1 −0.157 −0.151 −0.484 −0.451
0.053*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.057***
F2 0.084 0.119 0.188 0.208
0.028*** 0.030*** 0.036*** 0.036***
Constant 6.172 6.119 −0.882 −0.703
0.167*** 0.166*** 0.204*** 0.202***
Observations 3476 3476 3418 3418
R2 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.14
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant
at 1%.
Variables included in x are the age and age squared of the household head, a dummy for households
where the head is male, the log of the total household size, the share of males in the household, a
dummy for farms with total area smaller than 1 ha (farm type), the log size in ha. of the cotton plot,
the relative sizes of the cotton and maize plots, a dummy for livestock raising households, and harrows,
ploughs, basal fertilizer and top-dressing fertilizer in physical units.
31Table 8
Cotton Productivity
Entry and Exit in Cotton Farming
Model 1 Model 2
Tobit OLS CLAD Tobit OLS CLAD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Age of head 0.01 0.01 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.01
0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008
Age squared −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001
0.00007* 0.00007* 0.00007* 0.00007* 0.00007* 0.00007* 0.00007*
Male household head 0.088 0.114 0.103 0.111 0.116 0.104 0.113
0.047* 0.048** 0.047** 0.048** 0.048** 0.047** 0.048**
Family size 0.007 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.029 0.028 0.025
0.036 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037
Share of males −0.038 −0.023 −0.031 −0.033 −0.022 −0.031 −0.041
0.105 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.104
Farm type 0.057 0.027 0.019 0.039 0.024 0.016 0.032
0.044 0.045 0.044 0.044 0.045 0.044 0.044
Relative plot size −0.376 −0.42 −0.562 −0.43 −0.424 −0.565 −0.436
0.024*** 0.030*** 0.045*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.044*** 0.033***
Livestock −0.06 −0.035 −0.034 −0.044 −0.032 −0.033 −0.038
0.04 0.041 0.04 0.040 0.041 0.04 0.041
Harrows −0.064 −0.055 −0.056 −0.057 −0.057 −0.065 −0.063
0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053
Ploughs 0.034 0.041 0.04 0.035 0.04 0.039 0.037
0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
Basal fertilizer −0.713 −0.693 −0.672 −0.695 −0.691 −0.669 −0.696
0.257*** 0.252*** 0.250*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.250*** 0.252**
Top-dressing fert. −0.621 −0.598 −0.6 −0.597 −0.596 −0.601 −0.596
0.283** 0.277** 0.274** 0.277*** 0.276** 0.274** 0.276**
F1 −0.451 −0.519 −0.535 −0.496 −0.523 −0.536 −0.508
0.057*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.059***
F2 0.208 0.202 0.209 0.203 0.202 0.208 0.202
0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036***
φ 0.002 0.01 0.003 0.003 0.01 0.003
0.001** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001**
Constant −0.703 −0.902 −1.031 −0.704 −0.912 −1.027 −0.717
0.202*** 0.212*** 0.208*** 0.201*** 0.213*** 0.209*** 0.202***
Observations 3418 3418 3418 3418 3418 3418 3418
R2 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Robust standard errors in parentheses: * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Column (1) does not include φ.
Tobit, OLS and CLAD refer to diﬀerent models used to estimate φ. See Appendix 1.
Model 1: ﬁrst stage includes total land tenure, family size, age, age squared, farm type, a dummy for male-headed farms, the
proportion of males in the family, a dummy for livestock rasing households, and assets (harrows, ploughs) in monetary units.
Model 2: ﬁrst stage includes total land tenure, family size, age, age squared, farm type, a dummy for male-headed farms, the
proportion of males in the family, a dummy for livestock rasing households, and assets (harrows, ploughs) in physical units.
32Table 9
Cotton Productivity
Non-Linearity of Unobserved Productivity
Model 1 Model 2
Tobit Robinson Tobit Robinson
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age of household head 0.01 0.0099 0.009 0.0098
0.008 0.0075 0.008 0.0075
Age squared −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001
0.00007* 0.00007* 0.00007* 0.00007*
Male household head 0.114 0.12 0.116 0.117
0.048** 0.053** 0.048** 0.053**
Family size 0.027 0.023 0.029 0.024
0.037 0.036 0.037 0.037
Share of males -0.023 -0.024 -0.022 -0.024
0.105 0.101 0.105 0.101
Farm type 0.027 0.035 0.024 0.032
0.045 0.043 0.045 0.043
Relative plot size -0.42 -0.421 -0.424 -0.424
0.030*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.028***
Livestock -0.035 -0.035 -0.032 -0.032
0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041
Harrows -0.055 -0.054 -0.057 -0.055
0.053 0.048 0.053 0.048
Ploughs 0.041 0.041 0.04 0.041
0.027 0.021** 0.027 0.021**
Basal fertilizer -0.693 -0.0007 -0.691 -0.0007
0.252*** 0.0002*** 0.252*** 0.0001***
Top-dressing fertilizer -0.598 -0.0006 -0.596 -0.0006
0.277** 0.0001*** 0.276** 0.0001***
F1 -0.519 -0.523 -0.523 -0.527
0.061*** 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.059
F2 0.202 0.202 0.202 0.201
0.036*** 0.037** 0.036*** 0.037***
φ 0.002 yes 0.003 yes
0.001** - 0.001*** -
Constant -0.902 -0.006 -0.912 -0.006
0.212*** 0.016 0.213*** 0.016
Observations 3418 3418 3418 3418
R2 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.13
Robust standard errors in parentheses: * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant
at 1%.
For a description of Models 1 and 2, see note in Table 8.
Columns (1) and (3) use a Tobit procedure in the selection model and OLS in the productivity
model. Columns (2) and (4) use a Tobit procedure in the selection model and a partially

























































































































































































































































































































































































































Sensitivity to the Deﬁnition of the Reform
Model 1 Model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
φ 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003









Dummy 1998 0.337 0.336
0.054*** 0.054***
Dummy 1999 0.023 0.023
0.059 0.059
Dummy 2000 -0.408 -0.412
0.068*** 0.069***
Dummy 2001 0.203 0.201
0.055*** 0.055***
Dummy 2002 0.402 0.401
0.054*** 0.054***
Constant -0.902 -0.691 -0.982 -0.912 -0.701 -0.989
0.212*** 0.212*** 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.213***
Observations 3418 3418 3418 3418 3418 3418
R2 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.16
Robust standard errors in parentheses: * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Model 1: ﬁrst stage includes total land tenure, family size, age, age squared, farm type, a dummy for
male-headed farms, the proportion of males in the family, a dummy for livestock rasing households, and
assets (harrows, ploughs) in monetary units.
Model 2: ﬁrst stage includes total land tenure, family size, age, age squared, farm type, a dummy for
male-headed farms, the proportion of males in the family, a dummy for livestock rasing households, and
assets (harrows, ploughs) in physical units.
35Table 12
Cotton Productivity
Sensitivity to the Sample
Model 1 Model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
φ 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003









Dummy 1998 0.338 0.336
0.054*** 0.054***
Dummy 1999 0.038 0.037
0.059 0.059
Dummy 2000 -0.407 -0.411
0.068*** 0.069***
Dummy 2001 0.196 0.194
0.055*** 0.055***
Dummy 2002 0.415 0.414
0.054*** 0.054***
Constant -0.857 -0.638 -0.942 -0.872 -0.652 -0.953
0.215*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.215***
Observations 3462 3462 3462 3462 3462 3462
R2 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.16
Robust standard errors in parentheses: * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Model 1: ﬁrst stage includes total land tenure, family size, age, age squared, farm type, a dummy for
male-headed farms, the proportion of males in the family, a dummy for livestock rasing households, and
assets (harrows, ploughs) in monetary units.
Model 2: ﬁrst stage includes total land tenure, family size, age, age squared, farm type, a dummy for
male-headed farms, the proportion of males in the family, a dummy for livestock rasing households, and











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Determinants of Land Cotton Shares
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Age of household head −1.00 −0.21 −0.86 −0.45 −0.08 −0.68
0.51 0.57 0.51 0.70 0.56 0.49
Age squared 0.004 −0.003 0.004 −0.001 −0.004 0.0006
0.005 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.005
Family size 2.53 4.77 0.01 0.26 −4.87 2.37
2.42 2.72 2.62 3.11 2.70 2.49
Male household head 9.79 10.70 6.59 5.87 11.54 7.90
3.56 3.88 3.69 4.45 3.76 3.04
Share of males 18.02 11.72 12.87 −0.11 6.13 −9.04
6.82 7.47 7.41 8.76 7.02 6.42
Total land 29.30 33.07 34.51 34.20 31.69 23.53
2.11 2.40 2.51 3.35 2.43 1.94
Farm type 1.26 −0.63 3.06 23.41 4.32 −0.27
3.03 3.82 3.80 5.41 3.45 3.10
Livestock −1.67 3.61 6.64 9.33 3.80 3.18
2.71 2.99 3.07 3.59 3.05 2.80
Value of harrows 0.36 3.09 2.72 1.00 - 1.73
2.51 2.40 1.65 2.53 - 1.39
Value of ploughs −2.04 −4.32 −3.15 0.21 - 0.43
1.11 1.05 0.84 0.74 - 0.57
Constant −28.43 −59.26 −51.40 −82.93 −51.00 −21.36
14.01 15.52 14.50 18.43 15.43 13.57
Tobit estimates of land cotton shares. Includes dummy district variables. A separate regression is run
in each year to account to macro shocks, prices, and the reforms. Since no information on assets was
collected in 2001, the Tobit speciﬁcation for that year does not include the value of harrows and the
value of ploughs.
38Figure 1
Trends in Agricultural Productivity
Maize, Mixed Beans, Millet, Sorghum, Sunﬂower, and Groundnuts
mixed beans
year




































Note: The graphs compare the trend in maize productivity with the trends in productivity in alternative
crops. Starting at the top-left, the panels represent the cases of Mixed Beans, Millet, Sorghum, Sunﬂower,
and Groundnuts, respectively. In each panel, the solid line represents the trends in maize productivity and
the broken line, the trend in the productivity in the alternative crops.
39Figure 2
Trends in Maize Productivity
Reform Provinces versus Non-Reform Provinces
 
year





Note: The graph reports the trends in maize productivity in reform provinces (solid line) and non-reform
provinces (broken line). Estimates based on the Post Harvest Survey.
40Figure 3
Average Productivity
Entry and Exit into Cotton Farming
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